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In 1966, the Ford Foundation began its ten year, eighty million dollar program 
for American symphony orchestras. Through a combination of matched 
endowment fund contributions and unconditionally distributed expendable 
funds, the Ford Foundation dramatically altered the condition of the professional 
orchestral community in the United States by encouraging longer seasons, more 
concerts, higher pay for musicians, and an improved artistic product. Considered 
quantitatively, the Ford Foundation’s Program for Symphony Orchestras—
including the matching funds raised by the orchestras themselves—resulted in an 
outlay of more than $160 million for symphony orchestras. Adjusted for inflation, 
that amount would be worth roughly one billion dollars in 2016, or more than six 
times the 2016 congressional appropriation for the National Endowment for the 
Arts.1 
 
The largest single act of arts philanthropy in the history of the United States, the 
Ford Foundation’s Program for Symphony Orchestras was a broad attempt to 
professionalize U.S. orchestras and legitimize orchestral performance as a serious 
career path. With multiple stakeholders, including orchestras, orchestral 
musicians, audience members, donors, community members, and the Ford 
Foundation itself, a comprehensive accounting of the Program for Symphony 
Orchestras and its efficacy requires the careful untying of an expansive web of 
causalities. Toward this aim, this essay is an initial examination of the impact of 
the Program for Symphony Orchestras on the orchestras, the musicians, and 
finally the Ford Foundation itself. 
 
The Ford Foundation’s Program for 
Symphony Orchestras 
 
As early as 1957, W. McNeil Lowry and the Ford Foundation’s Humanities and 
Arts program began researching what would become its signature program, an 
eighty million dollar program for North American symphony orchestras. The 
Foundation conducted years of research involving meetings in New York, 
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extensive correspondence, and visits to orchestras and communities throughout 
the country, and consulted managers, musicians, conductors, union leaders, and 
others concerning the needs of orchestral musicians and the problems facing 
American orchestras. 
 
George Kuyper, manager of the Chicago Symphony from 1944 to 1959, became a 
lead consultant for the Ford Foundation, and described to Lowry several 
problems facing symphonic orchestras in the United States. Beyond the 
difficulties of building audiences, managing expenses, and cultivating donors, 
Kuyper articulated the struggle in finding musicians:  
One of the great problems for the future is the shortage of players able to 
carry their weight. The Chicago Symphony added five new players this 
year and had to raid smaller orchestras like New Orleans, Kansas City and 
so on to do so. If the smaller orchestra dries up, the big ones will, 
therefore dry up too, because the conservatories are not training 
replacements.2 
 
Ford Foundation staff interviewed conductor, impresario, and Metropolitan 
Opera broadcast commentator Boris Goldovsky no fewer than nine times 
between 1957 and 1964, and consulted with renowned conductors such as 
Leopold Stokowski and Fritz Reiner.3 Lowry’s report of his discussion with 
Stokowski in November 1958 includes Stokowski’s thoughts on the business of 
orchestras, and his insistence that orchestras could not support themselves 
through ticket sales alone: “Eventually we have to find a way to overcome these 
difficulties through foundations, government support or some other way. 
Government support, however, would require more taxation and people don’t 
want to stand for it.”4 
 
Although foundation leaders talked extensively to conductors regarding the 
challenges faced by orchestras, they were also careful to forge relationships with 
the American Federation of Musicians and the American Symphony Orchestra 
League (ASOL, known today as the League of American Orchestras). Helen 
Thompson of the American Symphony Orchestra League appears to have 
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suggested the idea for a large-scale program for symphony orchestras sometime 
in 1959, and ASOL provided the Foundation with information on orchestra 
budgets as early as 1957.5 The Symphony Orchestra League provided the 
Foundation with information concerning orchestral budgets, expenditures, 
endowments, and leadership, and in 1964 Thompson relayed the results of a 
study to the Ford Foundation showing that during the thirty-five year period 
ending in 1962–1963, nineteen of the larger American orchestras had increased 
gross expenditures by 83 percent but average base pay by only 74 percent. In 
addition, although the number of concerts played had increased by 24 percent, 
the number of work weeks had only increased by 10 percent.6  
 
Meetings with union leadership (the AFM) indicated not only the difficulties of a 
career in the orchestra (low pay, irregular employment schedules, etc.) but also 
trepidation regarding a large-scale infusion of Foundation funding. In a 1961 
meeting with AFM president Herman Kenin and officials from the New Orleans, 
Atlanta, Seattle, Newark, Pittsburgh, and Detroit locals, many issues facing 
orchestral musicians were discussed. If the Foundation were to give large 
amounts of money to the orchestras, some worried that local donors might curtail 
their contributions under the assumption that costs were now covered by an 
enormously wealthy third party (a fear articulated in the literature as “crowding 
out”): “If the FF were to aid in the expanded program, care must be taken to 
make clear to the local citizenry that their help is still needed, perhaps more than 
ever.” 7 Because the Foundation money wouldn’t exist in perpetuity, the 
orchestras would need to maintain ties to local donors while simultaneously 
receiving the Foundation’s support. 
 
Throughout these exchanges with Thompson and leaders of the American 
Federation of Musicians, several overarching concerns became apparent to Ford 
Foundation leaders. First, although it was necessary to guarantee year-long (fifty-
two-week) employment for the players, it would only be possible if salaries 
increased enough for musicians to drop other non-musical, part-time jobs.8 
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Secondly, if there were to be a large infusion of Ford Foundation money, local 
fundraising mechanisms would need to be maintained and new ones developed. 
Finally, it would be essential not only to provide short-term operational support, 
but also to encourage the creation and augmentation of orchestral endowment 
funds. 
 
Taking these issues into consideration, McNeil Lowry and his staff submitted a 
discussion paper concerning a “program for symphony orchestras” to the Ford 
Foundation’s Executive Committee in September 1964, a request for up to $110 
million to “consolidate, through one historic action, the position of the symphony 
orchestra in the United States.”9 Of this $110 million, $25 million would be 
granted as expendable funds, and $77–85 million, in the form of Ford Motor 
Company stock, would be held in trust, and distributed to the orchestras after a 
period of ten years. Lowry explicitly outlined the mission of the proposed 
program:  
The purposes of such a program would be 1) to maintain and improve the 
quality of performance of fine music by the leading orchestras in the 
country; 2) to increase the amount of quality music played by these 
orchestras; 3) to improve the financial situation of orchestral musicians 
and so to ensure an adequate supply of fine players both now and in the 
future; and 4) to stabilize the financial position of the leading American 
orchestras.10 
 
Once the Ford Foundation’s board formally approved Lowry’s program, the 
Foundation notified the public about the Symphony Orchestra Program via press 
release on October 22, 1965.11 Negotiations with individual orchestras during the 
following months determined appropriate allocations of expendable and 
endowment funds, and by June 1966, the sixty-one participating orchestras were 
privy to the grant terms and their individual allocations.12  
 
Despite Lowry’s earlier hopes of a $77–85 million trust, the approved trust was 
smaller, at $58.75 million, with $58 million comprising the endowment fund 
contributions of the Foundation and the remaining $750,000 allocated to the two 
program beneficiaries for which no endowment funds were distributed: The 
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Symphony Orchestra of Puerto Rico, which was given $375,000 to promote 
annual tours in the Caribbean, and the American Symphony Orchestra League, 
which received $360,000 for the purpose of “strengthening the services” of that 
organization “to its Member Orchestras.”13 The money placed in trust was in 
addition to the expendable funds of $21.65 million, which provided the 
orchestras with immediate support over the first five years of the program, 
regardless of each orchestra’s matching ability.  
 
Thus, the participating organizations received a combination of expendable funds 
paid quarterly during the first five years of the program and endowment funds, 
payable at the termination of the grant period on June 30, 1976.14 In order to 
assure that they would raise the money, the endowment funds would only be 
released to the orchestras that succeeded in raising matching funds to the 
Foundation’s contributions. Although the orchestras received notice of the grant 
program in 1966 and could count on a certain level of expendable funds over the 
next five years, they were not entitled to any of the endowment money until 1976, 
and only then if they had demonstrated the ability to raise matching funds in the 
first five years of the program.  
 
Evaluating the Efficacy of the Program 
for Symphony Orchestras 
 
Regarding Lowry’s aforementioned goals of strengthening orchestras 
qualitatively—“to improve the quality of performance of fine music by the leading 
orchestras in the country” and “to stabilize the financial position of the leading 
American orchestra”—as well as quantitatively—“to increase the amount of 
quality music played by these orchestras” and “to improve the financial situation 
of orchestral musicians and so to ensure an adequate supply of fine players both 
now and in the future”—the symphony orchestra program relied on the matching 
requirement as its central mechanism. 
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Useful not only as a means to multiply foundation contributions, matching 
programs continue to be an effective motivating tool for arts patrons. Used not 
only by private foundations, but also by the National Endowment for the Arts, 
matching requirements have been explicitly applied since the 1960s. Earlier 
philanthropic programs in the Arts, like the Rockefeller Foundation’s 1934 
assistance to the Theater Department at the University of Iowa, implied a 
matching principle in that the Foundation would only provide a small amount of 
support to supplement monies raised by the local community.15  
 
Describing the psychological imperative encouraged by matching programs, 
Michael Morgan, Music Director of the Oakland-East Bay Symphony Orchestra 
said: “Matching programs are always useful, because people for whatever reason 
feel inclined to donate when they think there is a match or when the thing is 
going to be doubled.”16  
 
Thus, although the multiplying of funds achieves the most palpable impact of a 
successful matching program, matching programs can also be—at their best—
vehicles to develop sustainable fundraising mechanisms that will nourish 
institutions beyond the terminal duration of the matching program itself.  
 
Concerning the Ford Foundation Symphony Orchestra Program, except for the 
Kansas City Symphony, the American Symphony, the Oklahoma City Symphony, 
the Festival Orchestra of New York, the Little Orchestra (N.Y.), and the Brooklyn 
Philharmonic, all of the orchestras met or exceeded their required matching 
amounts; at the end of the matching period a total of more than eighty four 
million dollars—nearly half a billion dollars of purchasing power in 2016—had 
been independently raised by all of the orchestras.17  
 
For example, the New York Philharmonic was notified of a total grant of $1.5 
million on June 24, 1966.18 As the Foundation’s letter to the Orchestra explains, 
$1 million would be devoted to endowment funds (payable at the end of the ten-
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year period) and $.5 million would be designated as expendable funds and paid 
quarterly from 1966 to 1971. Like other premier orchestras, the New York 
Philharmonic was obligated to match each Ford Foundation endowment dollar at 
a 2:1 ratio. Thus, the total impact of the Program would be the $1.5 million from 
the Foundation, plus the $2 million raised by the orchestra itself, for a total of 
$3.5 million. 
 
The Minnesota Orchestra was required to raise $4 million in order to claim a 
final endowment grant of $2 million from the foundation. Already an orchestra 
experiencing a meteoric growth pattern, the required matching figure was easily 
surpassed, with a total of just under $8 million raised by 1971.19  
 
In the case of the Little Orchestra Society, a New York City orchestra that is still 
active today, the Foundation demanded at the start of the program in 1966 “that 
the Orchestra take effective steps to diversify its base of philanthropic support.”20 
Although the Little Orchestra’s 1971 report furnished to the Ford Foundation 
showed that it had managed to raise some money, it did so with more than 99 
percent of its funding coming from the music director, Thomas K. Scherman, and 
the Scherman Foundation, a family foundation for which the conductor was a 
benefactor.21 In addition to the fact that the Little Orchestra simply failed to raise 
the required amount of $350,000, the Foundation chose to discontinue the Little 
Orchestra from the Symphony Orchestra Program because it failed to diversify its 
fundraising base beyond its independently wealthy music director and his family 
fortune.22 
 
Although some of the orchestras were savvy enough to nurture and capitalize on 
their endowment funds, many of the less sophisticated ones were not. In 
addition, a successful matching campaign did not necessarily ensure long-term 
success. In the case of the Oakland Symphony, for example, successful matching 
efforts appear to have had the opposite effect, with the orchestra eventually filing 
for bankruptcy in 1986, despite receiving more than $1 million as part of the 
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Symphony Orchestra Program. Beginning in the mid 1960s, the orchestra 
dramatically and unsustainably raised minimum weekly salaries from $98 in the 
1965–1966 season to $225 in the 1969–1970 season.23 By contrast, during the 
same period the Minnesota Orchestra and the Chicago Symphony raised weekly 
minimums at a considerably more incremental rate, from $165 to $205, and $210 
to $295, respectively.24  
 
The Ford Foundation’s money worked best in cities where the money could be 
used to improve on an already stable situation. Danny Newman, who worked in 
marketing for the Lyric Opera of Chicago from 1954 to 2002 and authored the 
influential book Subscribe Now!: Building Arts Audiences through Dynamic 
Subscription Promotion, served as a Ford Foundation consultant for orchestras 
in the 1960s and 1970s. As an adjunct to the Symphony Orchestra Program, the 
Ford Foundation underwrote Newman’s consulting services for various 
orchestras, which largely focused on developing successful subscription sale 
campaigns. His reports to Marcia Thompson on his experiences with various 
orchestras document the wide variety of difficulties faced in the orchestral 
community, and serve as a frank appraisal of the orchestral business in the 1960s 
and 1970s. 
 
With the Minnesota Orchestra, an aforementioned orchestra on a dramatic 
upward trajectory in the 1960s and 1970s, Newman helped the Orchestra 
transition from the unwieldy Northrop Hall—which was too large to fill with 
nearly 5000 seats—and increase ticket sales from 8,377 in 1969-1970 to 17,609 in 
1975-1976.25 Partnering with an enthusiastic and competent board, stable 
management, and a devoted audience base, the Ford Foundation’s efforts with 
the Minnesota Orchestra, through the Symphony Orchestra Program as well as 
the underwriting of Danny Newman’s expertise, exemplified the possibilities of 
philanthropy in the arts. 
By contrast, Newman’s encounters with the Oakland Symphony Orchestra reveal 
a continuously struggling organization. Constant manager turnover, an 
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unpopular music director26, an unfillable concert hall, and a deep-seated 
inferiority complex regarding the San Francisco Symphony Orchestra27 all 
contributed to the difficult situation in Oakland which is best summarized in 
Autopsy of an Orchestra: An Analysis of Factors Contributing to the 
Bankruptcy of the Oakland Symphony Orchestra, a study commissioned in 1987 
by the California Arts Council, the Walter and Elise Haas Fund, the James Irvine 
Foundation, Mervyn’s Stores, The San Francisco Foundation, and the Wells 
Fargo Foundation. Although the authors of Autopsy of An Orchestra describe the 
many factors that contributed to orchestra’s financial troubles, they specifically 
reference the inability of the orchestra’s management to convert the Ford money 
into sustainable, positive change: 
Radical change in organizations is not easy. But major reorganization may 
become a necessity for some mid-sized orchestras faced with insolvency. 
A change of the magnitude called for in Oakland’s case would have meant 
a major confrontation with the artistic personnel. Since the availability of 
the Ford Foundation money and its match provided an early, 
nonconfrontational alternative for the Oakland board, it never faced the 
hard decisions until the funds were exhausted, and then it was too late to 
save the situation.28  
 
Finally, instead of placing money from the Ford Foundation into a restricted 
permanent endowment fund, the Oakland Symphony used the money to pay back 
a $1 million loan that was taken out in 1972 to renovate the orchestra’s home, the 
gigantic Paramount Theater. This misappropriation allowed for the orchestra to 
easily cannibalize the endowment, which consisted of less than $250,000 by 
1985, despite the orchestra receiving more than $2 million—including matching 
funds raised by the Orchestra—as part of the Ford program. Ultimately 
unprepared to capitalize on the Ford Foundation’s multi-million-dollar 
contribution, the Orchestra collapsed under insurmountable debt in 1986. 
 
Although the bankruptcy of the Oakland Symphony Orchestra—despite its 
success in matching the Ford Foundation’s endowment funds—was exceptional, 
orchestras large and small have continued to demonstrate considerable financial 
instability. In 1981-82, one third of the larger orchestras reported deficits; by the 
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1985-86 season, two thirds of these orchestras reported deficits.29 Although 
several larger orchestras, including the Denver Symphony Orchestra and New 
Orleans Symphony were dissolved in the late 1980s along with the Oakland 
orchestra, the economic downturn that began in 2007 led to organizational strife 
in many U.S. orchestras. Because orchestras rely primarily on donations from 
wealthy individuals, the dramatic dive in real estate and investment security 
values led to a slow-down in contributions to even premier U.S. orchestras. 
 
The declaration of bankruptcy by the Philadelphia Orchestra—one of the original 
‘big five’ orchestras, along with the Boston Symphony, New York Philharmonic, 
Cleveland Orchestra, and Chicago Symphony—in 2011, signaled that no orchestra 
in the United States was ‘too big to fail’. The result of many factors, including 
high turnover of administrative staff, an unsustainable contractual agreement 
with the musicians, and the myriad costs associated with the Kimmel Center—an 
extravagant new performance space—rendered the Philadelphia Orchestra 
extremely vulnerable to the financial crisis.30 Although the Orchestra filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy—a means to reorganize existing contractual obligations—
as opposed to the more draconian Chapter 7 filing, the bankruptcy signaled to 
many the decline of a once unrivaled brand. 
 
A similar brand erosion occurred with the Minnesota Orchestra, which failed to 
perform from October 2012 until February 2014 because of contractual 
disagreements between musicians and management. Winner of a Grammy award 
in 2013, and hailed in 2010 by New Yorker music critic Alex Ross as sounding 
“…like the greatest orchestra in the world,” artistic excellence could not prevent 
what became arguably the most acrimonious contract disputes in the modern 
history of U.S. orchestras.31 
 
Although both the Philadelphia and Minnesota situations occurred more than 
thirty years after the end of the Program for Symphony Orchestras, 
reverberations of the Program can be felt in the contentious contract negotiations 
 
12 R A C  R E S E A R C H  R E P O R T S  
in each case. Because raising musicians salaries and building endowments was 
one of the primary goals of the Symphony Orchestra Program, its impact on the 
musicians, and by extension its impact on the relations between musicians and 
management can be acutely felt today. Michael Morgan, Music Director of the 
Oakland-East Bay Symphony Orchestra—a position he has held since the 
Orchestra was formed in 1990 to fill the void left by the bankrupted Oakland 
Symphony—recently described the modern implications of the Symphony 
Orchestra Program in grim terms: 
They basically ruined the business….What they did was pump a lot of 
money into orchestras, which was great at the time…and just gave 
everyone huge expectations….It’s like anything, in that once somebody 
gets something, they think they’re going to have it all the time, and now 
everyone has really contentious negotiations…because everyone thinks 
there’s more money around than there is. And all of that started back 
then, people and the players thinking there’s a whole big pile of money 
being hidden from them somewhere, it makes the relations more 
adversarial when people think there’s something being kept away from 
them.32 
 
Alluding to the fact that the Ford Program raised musician salaries and 
endowments without addressing the structural issues in the orchestra business—
the consistent inability of ticket sales to cover expenses and the declining interest 
in orchestral music in the United States—Morgan highlights the difficulty in 
evaluating the Symphony Orchestra Program. 
 
In fact, musician salaries have risen dramatically as a result of the Ford Program. 
In 1965, Los Angeles Philharmonic manager W.O. Severs cited public teacher 
salaries as a target for orchestra member salaries: “He believes they should take 
teachers’ salaries as a yardstick with $10,000 as the minimum salary….At the 
present this minimum is about $7,500 or $8,000.”33 The comparison between 
the salaries of public school teachers and orchestral musicians presents an 
interesting comparison and a provocative commentary on the exceptional growth 
of the salaries of orchestral musicians. 
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As suggested by W.O. Severs, the average California public school teacher’s 
annual salary in the late 1960s was just over $10,000 ($65,000 in 2016 dollars).34 
The philharmonic’s average salary rose dramatically during the early years of the 
Symphony Orchestra Program from $10,086 in 1966-67 to $12,742 in 1968-69.35 
By 1972, the orchestra’s minimum salary had risen to nearly $15,000, by 1982 
$38,500, by 1992 $66,480, and by 2000 $89,880.36 By the 2014-15 season, the 
musicians of the Los Angeles Philharmonic were guaranteed the highest base 
salary of any orchestral musicians in the United States, with an annual minimum 
of $150,124, outpacing even the traditional ‘Big Five’ orchestras of Chicago, New 
York, Boston, Cleveland, and Philadelphia.37 
 
The Los Angeles Philharmonic was not the only orchestra in which musicians 
made less than public school teachers in the 1960s. In 1965-66 only in the ‘Big 
Five’ orchestras were median salaries higher than those of public school 
teachers.38 But by the early seventies—when the Ford Foundation completed its 
distribution of expendable funds—salaries in many orchestras matched or 
exceeded local teacher salaries. Today, teacher salaries serve as an altogether 
ineffectual yardstick for the salaries of musicians in major orchestras. In none of 
the states with the twenty highest paying U.S. Orchestras did the average public 
school teacher’s salary come close to the minimum salary enjoyed by orchestra 
members:  
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 Orchestra 
 
Average State Teacher Salary 2011-
12
39
 
Base Orchestra Salary 2011-
12
40
 
   1 Chicago Symphony 
 
$36,636 $144,040 
2 Los Angeles Philharmonic 
 
$41,259 $143,260 
3 San Francisco Symphony 
 
$41,259 $141,700 
4 New York Philharmonic 
 
$44,370 $134,940 
5 Boston Symphony 
 
$40,462 $132,028 
6 National Symphony 
 
$51,539 $126,984 
7 Cleveland Orchestra 
 
$33,035 $120,120 
8 Minnesota Orchestras 
 
$34,035 $111,566 
9 Philadelphia Orchestra $41,192 $108,750 
10 Pittsburgh Symphony 
 
$41,192 $100,110 
11 Cincinnati Symphony 
 
$33,035 $96,730 
12 Dallas Symphony 
 
$34,234 $90,814 
13 Houston Symphony 
 
$34,234 $82,160 
14 Atlanta Symphony 
 
$33,673 $81,640 
15 St. Louis Symphony 
 
$29,857 $80,680 
16 Detroit Symphony 
 
$34,734 $79,000 
17 Indianapolis Symphony $33,574 $78,000 
18 Baltimore Symphony 
 
$43,003 $65,000 
19 Utah Symphony 
 
$33,268 $59,000 
20 San Diego Symphony 
 
$41,259 $57,708 
 
 
These data are not intended to compare the work done by orchestra musicians or 
public school teachers, but instead to illustrate how dramatically orchestral 
salaries have risen since the 1960s, when the Ford Foundation as well as 
orchestra executives cited comparisons between musician and teacher salaries. 
Concerning this dramatic increase in musician salaries, it is clear that the 
situation of top orchestral musicians benefitted dramatically—in terms of salary 
increases—during and after the Symphony Orchestra Program.  
 
Conclusion: The Ford Foundation and 
the Symphony Orchestra Program 
 
Having discussed the impact of the Ford Foundation’s Program for Symphony 
Orchestras on orchestras and musicians, I conclude by contending that the 
Program also had a dramatic effect on the Ford Foundation itself. Like the 
orchestras that it funded, the Ford Foundation was, in the 1950s and 1960s 
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experiencing a rapid transition, from a small organization with a local focus, to a 
multi-billion dollar international institution. 
 
Central to this transition was the first public offering of Ford Motor Company 
Stock in the mid 1950s, which had previously been owned almost entirely by the 
Ford Foundation. The gradual sale of the stock enriched the Foundation to an 
unprecedented level of prosperity that dwarfed the Rockefeller Foundation, the 
second largest foundation in the United States.41 The creation of Lowry’s Arts and 
Humanities Program in 1957 and the subsequent Program for Symphony 
Orchestras were the direct result of the Foundation’s wealth. The entirety of the 
endowment trust created for the participants in the Symphony Orchestra 
Program consisted of Ford Motor Company Stock; thus, the fortunes of the 
individual orchestras—at least from 1966 to 1976—mirrored the performance of 
the Ford Motor Company. 
 
In addition, by distributing stock to the grantees, the Ford Foundation 
contributed to its mission of diversifying its investment portfolio while 
simultaneously guaranteeing that the shares would be held in trust for at least ten 
years. As a result of this arrangement, the Ford Motor Company and its 
shareholders were shielded from the uncertainty of a sale of $58 million in 
shares—the total amount of the endowment trust.  
 
This mutually beneficial outcome surely pleased Henry Ford II—the grandson of 
Ford patriarch Henry Ford—who in 1966 was a member of the Ford Foundation’s 
Board of Directors while concurrently serving as Chairman of the Ford Motor 
Company’s Board. But the Symphony Orchestra Program also had ramification 
on the grant-making activities of the Foundation, and specifically the 
Foundation’s efforts in the Arts.    
 
As early as 1973, some Ford Foundation officials largely characterized the 
Symphony Orchestra Program as misguided. Ford Foundation staff member Paul 
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Ylvisaker predicted that “all it would do is raise the union wages and would put 
the orchestras right back where they had been.” Describing the Program overall 
as “a disaster from start to finish,” Ylvisaker’s claims were based on the idea that 
without drastic changes such as raising revenues, lowering expenses, and 
building audiences, the Foundation’s contributions would ultimately fail to 
foment any sustainable change.42 In her 1973 oral history, Marcia Thompson (not 
to be confused with Helen Thompson, the ASOL director), the Ford Foundation 
Program Officer presiding over the Symphony Orchestra Program, distrusted the 
abilities of the individual orchestras to manage their own large endowments: “If 
we had to do it over, if we had that $80 million…I wouldn’t start out with 
endowment because I think endowment is only as good as the management of the 
endowment or the management of the institution, and I just don’t think most 
symphony orchestras have disciplined themselves sufficiently.”43 
 
Echoing Michael Morgan’s aforementioned comment that the Ford Program 
encouraged a situation where “everyone thinks there’s more money than there 
is,” Marcia Thompson recalls the Program—from the perspective of the 
Foundation—in similar terms: 
Unfortunately, that program paid out over a number of years, so there 
was a tendency, on the part of some boards, to think that there was a 
jackpot of money that they had acquired. At the end of the period, by that 
time without realizing it, they had already spent it. On contracts and other 
things.44 
 
As a result of the difficulties encountered during the Symphony Orchestra 
Program, the Ford Foundation and specifically the Program in the Humanities 
and the Arts ultimately pivoted away from large endowment programs. Marcia 
Thompson continued: “We got to the point of not wanting to give money for 
endowments, but to give money for performance and salaries, and involvement in 
communities.”45 Beginning in the early 1970s, the Foundation made ‘stabilization’ 
grants to individual arts institutions, which gave the Foundation ‘teeth’—as 
described by Thompson—via more hands-on involvement:  
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Well, you set some performance targets, rather than just giving out 
money, and the Stabilization Program required that there was certain 
monitoring by the board about their funds, and what they replaced, and 
what they used. I mean, we put some teeth into it, we’ll put it that way. 
Instead of just making the grant, and expecting that they had the capacity 
to do certain things. Stabilization put some requirements on, in terms of 
reporting and demonstration of leadership abilities.46 
 
In conclusion, the Ford Foundation’s Program for Symphony Orchestras created 
very different outcomes for its various stakeholders. For orchestral musicians in 
grantee orchestras, the Symphony Orchestra Program undoubtedly created a 
more lucrative working environment, as defined by longer seasons and larger 
salaries. In orchestras that expanded to fifty-two week, or nearly fifty-two week 
seasons, musicians were able to drop other musical—and/or non-musical—part 
time jobs, and focus on life in their orchestras. But for the orchestras themselves, 
as argued by Michael Morgan and evident in the downfall of the Oakland 
Symphony Orchestra, the Ford Program failed to stabilize many orchestras, and 
in some cases led to dire consequences. Finally, for the Ford Foundation, the 
results of the Symphony Orchestra Program led to a dramatic stylistic shift in 
grant making, and a tempering of expectations regarding the impact of large-
scale programs in the Arts. 
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